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Summary 
 
 
 
The role of taxpayer education in improving tax compliance has been largely unexplored in the 
literature. This paper starts to fill this gap by providing the first rigorous evaluation of the 
effectiveness of taxpayer education on knowledge, perceptions, and compliance, which took 
place in Rwanda. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset that combines administrative and 
survey data. We show that taxpayer education results in significant and large increases in 
knowledge, which starts from a very low level at baseline, and that it contributes to improving 
compliance behaviour. Our strongest result is that training new taxpayers helps bring them 
into the habit of filing tax declarations – an obligation many fail to comply with. In terms of 
policy, our results show that the benefits of taxpayer education go beyond increased revenue 
in the short term, and include building a habit of tax compliance. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A recurring mantra in tax research is that information is key to tax administration (Pomeranz 
2015; Kleven et al. 2011). This is particularly true because better information about taxpayers’ 
activities and incomes can help enforcement, even though this potential can be severely 
limited in low- and middle-income countries where administrative capacity is relatively weak 
(Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal 2017; Mascagni, Mengistu and Wodleyes 2018). However, a 
much less studied aspect is how information affects taxpayers’ ability to cope and comply 
with the tax system. Some studies have shown that taxpayers are often confused about 
complex tax systems. As a result, they respond to it in ways that are inconsistent with 
standard tax policy (Feldman, Katuščáck and Kawano 2016), and in some cases they even 
end up paying more than they need to because they fail to take up provisions to their benefit 
(Benzarti 2015). This lack of information is consistent with a broader literature showing that 
people are often ill informed about tax and transfers that would affect their economic choices 
(Chetty, Looney and Kroft 2009; Liebman and Luttmer 2015). In African countries, low 
taxpayer knowledge is particularly severe, as the majority of Africans do not know what 
taxes they owe to the government or what tax payments are for (Isbell 2017; Aiko and Logan 
2014). When we asked Rwandan taxpayers when the deadline for filing taxes is, in the context 
of this study, less than a quarter of our survey respondents indicated the correct month. 
 
This paper starts to fill the evidence gap in this under-researched area by providing the first 
ever rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of taxpayer education on knowledge, 
perceptions, and compliance in Rwanda.1 We show that providing basic tax training 
significantly increases taxpayer knowledge and compliance behaviour. More specifically, it 
contributes to bringing them into the habit of filing tax declarations – an obligation many new 
taxpayers fail to comply with. 
 
Weak tax knowledge has a number of potentially serious implications. First of all, it can 
certainly affect tax compliance, which is the focus of our analysis. Smaller, less educated, 
or lower-income taxpayers are more likely to feel confused about complex tax rules, thus 
potentially failing to comply (e.g. not declaring or not doing so on time) or not taking full 
advantage of tax laws (e.g. failing to claim deductible expenses). Thus, an increase in 
knowledge for these taxpayers could have ambiguous effects on tax payments – positive in 
the first case (i.e. failure to comply) and negative in the second one (i.e. limited take-up). 
Beyond compliance, a poor understanding of the tax system is also likely to have broader 
implications. Confused taxpayers would not know with confidence how much they should pay, 
thus potentially being more vulnerable to corrupt officials or to be coerced into making 
unofficial payments. They may also be more prone to seeing the tax system as unjust, either 
because of corruption or because they might misperceive the benefits of paying tax. A recent 
study has shown that providing beneficiaries with information about the eligibility and amount 
of a subsidy increases the amount of subsidy they receive by about 26 per cent, thanks to 
lower leakage (Banerjee et al. 2018). The recent evidence on informal taxation suggests that 
similar effects are likely to occur also in the area of tax (van den Boogaard, Prichard and 
Jibao 2018). Ultimately, uninformed taxpayers are less likely to engage in a meaningful 
debate with the government about tax issues, thus limiting the potential of taxation to act as a 
catalyst for improved governance and accountability. 
 
Against this background, it seems particularly relevant, both for researchers and policymakers, 
to investigate what can be done to increase taxpayers’ knowledge – with the associated 
benefits that this may have, starting from improved compliance. One obvious possibility for 
 
1 The only other study available on this topic, Chetty and Saez (2013), only looks at reported income. 
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governments is to provide information and training for taxpayers. Importantly, this possibility is 
fully in line with a modern approach to tax administration, where increased compliance is 
achieved through both traditional enforcement and more friendly measures aimed at 
encouraging taxpayers to comply voluntarily. A large and growing experimental literature has 
tested the impact of letters sent by revenue authorities to nudge taxpayers to comply (for a 
review, see Mascagni (2018)). Such messages have generally been found to be effective in 
increasing compliance, including in two cases where they were tested in low-income contexts 
(Shimeles, Gurara and Woldeyes 2017; Mascagni, Nell and Monkam 2017). In the case of 
Rwanda, reminders of deadlines proved to be particularly effective, compared to message 
contents focused on deterrence or fiscal exchange (Mascagni et al. 2017). A related study 
collected anecdotal evidence that taxpayers particularly appreciated being reminded of 
declaration deadlines (Mukama, Karangwa and Hakizimana 2017), which was consistent with 
low levels of knowledge of basic tax parameters. 
 
However, these messages are mostly meant as nudges, not as attempts to increase 
knowledge in a more substantial way. A paper looking at the longer term effects of these 
messages confirms that they act as simple nudges, with very little or no learning at all in the 
longer term (Manoli and Turner 2014). In fact, revenue authorities do a lot more than sending 
letters to increase taxpayers’ knowledge and sensitise them on the importance to pay tax. A 
recent review of tax education initiatives in Africa shows that many revenue authorities run 
trainings and seminars for taxpayers, often focusing on specific sectors or specific groups 
(e.g. new taxpayers), tax education programmes in schools, and radio or TV programmes, 
amongst others (Mascagni and Santoro 2018). Similar initiatives on taxpayer education are 
likely to occur in other countries as well, but they remain almost entirely undocumented. 
More importantly, there is virtually no evaluation of the effect of taxpayer education on 
knowledge and compliance. The only rigorous study we could find on this subject looked at 
the effect of a two-minute training for recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the 
United States, showing it had no effect on average (Chetty and Saez 2013). 
 
This paper addresses this gap in the literature by evaluating the effectiveness of a taxpayer 
education programme on knowledge, perceptions, and tax compliance. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first rigorous and comprehensive study of taxpayer education to 
consider all these relevant outcomes in any country – as well as the first evaluation of 
taxpayer education in any low- or middle-income country. Our study departs from the literature 
on information nudges (e.g. letters) mostly because of the deeper and more comprehensive 
nature of our intervention, which explicitly aims to educate taxpayers on all basic aspects of 
the tax system. More specifically, we focus on a tax education programme run every year by 
the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) for a relatively homogeneous group of taxpayers: those 
who recently registered to obtain a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN, see section 2.1). We 
collected survey data on these new taxpayers before and after the training, and we also 
observe their compliance behaviour thanks to administrative data from tax returns (see 
section 2.2). Although attendance to the training could not be randomised, attendees and 
non-attendees are fully comparable before the training, across a rich set of observable 
dimensions including taxpayer characteristics (e.g. size, age, gender), baseline knowledge 
(measured with 19 indicators) and perceptions (e.g. on the tax system, state authority, and 
public services). We show that those who attend the training have much higher knowledge, 
better perceptions about the complexity of the tax system, and better compliance outcomes 
after taking the training – compared to those who did not attend. These effects hold once we 
control for a range of potentially relevant variables. We show that our results on compliance, 
particularly the positive effect on the probability to declare, are robust to concerns about 
identification and causality. We do so by using random assignment to our survey as an 
instrumental variable (IV) for attendance, as well as propensity score matching (PSM) on a 
wide range of observable characteristics (see section 3.4). We also explore whether the main 
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channel for the observed compliance effect is knowledge, against other possible explanations, 
and compare the RRA’s education programme to a potential one-to-one coaching alternative 
(see sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively). 
 
Taken together, our results suggest that the education programme of interest is highly effective 
to increase taxpayer knowledge and compliance behaviour. On the latter, and in line with the 
only other study in the field (Chetty and Saez 2013), the programme does not seem to 
increase reported income – or at least this result does not stand up well to further scrutiny with 
the available data (see section 3.4). However, it does significantly increase the probability that 
new taxpayers file a tax declaration in the first year since registration. This is particularly 
relevant to the Rwandan context, as over half of all newly registered taxpayers completely fail 
to file a declaration in the first year.2 The fact that the programme increases declaration rates 
is important because it builds a habit of declaring for those who have never been in the tax net 
before. A recent paper has shown that habit can be a powerful driver of compliance – a finding 
that is consistent to the separate, but related, literature on get-out-the-vote (Dunning et al. 
2017). Just the act of regularly paying taxes, or not doing so, can significantly affect 
compliance behaviour in the future. If taxpayer education can push new taxpayers into that 
habit, as we show here, there may well be positive compliance gains down the line – in 
addition to the immediate benefits in terms of expanding the tax base and building a 
compliance culture. Therefore, even if policymakers should not necessarily expect immediate 
revenue gains from training new taxpayers, our results still represent a clear recommendation 
to invest more in taxpayer education programmes. 
 
 
2 Research design and background 
 
2.1 Taxpayer education in Rwanda 
 
When it comes to tax, Rwanda is generally seen as a success story. The tax to GDP ratio 
stands at just over 15 per cent in 2015 (ATAF 2017), in line with other African countries. More 
importantly, the RRA is widely perceived as a performing revenue authority that has fully 
embraced a modern approach to tax administration, where encouraging voluntary compliance 
plays a key role in revenue mobilisation, along with traditional enforcement. Rwanda was one 
of the first countries to run a yearly National Taxpayer Appreciation Day, which normally entails 
events stretching well beyond a single day and is aimed to appreciate taxpayers’ contributions 
to national development through their tax payments. Partly reflecting the recent history of the 
country’s relations with foreign donors, the government has adopted a rhetoric of self-reliance 
that has domestic revenue mobilisation at its core. As we show in section 3.1, all this is 
reflected in exceptionally strong perceptions about the importance of taxpaying in contributing 
to national development. 
 
Against this background, the RRA’s Taxpayer Services (TPS) department organises a wide 
range of initiatives on taxpayer education including the National Taxpayer Appreciation Day, 
tax clubs in schools, and seminars for specific sectors or types of taxpayers.3 Amongst these 
is the training programme for newly registered taxpayers, which is the focus of this study. This 
programme involves a half-day class led by TPS officials and covers the basics of taxpaying; 
 
2 This figure is 57 per cent for taxpayers registered in 2017 and 53 per cent for those registered in 2015, prior to our study. 
3  For more details on these initiatives, in the context of taxpayer education in Africa more broadly, see Mascagni and Santoro 
(2018). 
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for example, explanations of the various taxes and duties, including their deadlines, what a 
TIN is and why it is needed, procedures for tax declaration and payment, services available for 
simplifying declarations and payments, such as online services, amongst others. As such, the 
content is more focused on providing practical information on taxpaying, rather than taking a 
broader approach based on accountability and citizen engagement. We would therefore 
expect it to have some impact on compliance behaviour, not least because it is specifically 
targeted at increasing taxpayer knowledge in this respect. Programme sessions are 
organised throughout the country, endeavouring to reach all tax centres where there are 
substantial numbers of new taxpayers who might need the training. Typically, the first session 
of the year is organised in July/August, to capture taxpayers who registered from January 
onwards, and other sessions continue to be held until the end of March, which is the deadline 
for filing income tax declarations for the year ending in December. All sessions are the same 
in terms of content, duration, and trainers, who are all RRA officials. The programme schedule 
for 2017/18 is reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
All participants are new taxpayers: they have typically registered for income taxes – personal 
income tax (PIT) or corporate income tax (CIT) – and obtained their TIN for the first time.4 
They are all from new businesses, either individual non-incorporated ones (PIT) or 
corporations (CIT), and not taxpayers who only have employment incomes. Regardless of the 
business type, this is a relatively homogeneous group of generally small firms (see 
section 3.1). Once they have registered, the RRA invites them to the first available session in 
their district. Invitations are normally sent via SMS or official letters posted at the office of the 
relevant tax centre or local branch of the Private Sector Federation. In addition, phone calls 
from RRA officials (from the TPS, typically) are made to remind taxpayers to attend the 
session. Although this invitation process is comprehensive in principle, practical difficulties 
and administrative constraints mean not all intended beneficiaries are reached.5 Nonetheless, 
the explicit intention of the RRA is to invite all new taxpayers and, potentially, keep the training 
accessible to any other taxpayer even if they were not specifically invited. In practice, the vast 
majority of attendees are new taxpayers from the relevant district. However, this policy 
intention means that we could not randomise invitations or attendance. 
 
This programme is the key initiative that the RRA currently takes to educate new taxpayers. In 
this evaluation, we also piloted a potential alternative and compared it with the existing 
programme. We randomly selected 275 taxpayers to take part in a one-to-one coaching 
programme (see section 3.3.2). This programme involved two phone calls from tax officials, in 
the three months prior to the filing deadline, offering to answer any question participant 
taxpayers may have on their declaration. Similar interventions have been tried in other 
countries, although they are often undocumented and not evaluated, but not in Rwanda. 
However, the feedback we collected from taxpayers on the existing training programme 
suggests that there might be appetite for such an option (see section 3.3.2). It therefore 
seemed relevant to pilot and evaluate it, for potential consideration in the future – more likely 
as a complementary measure to the existing programme, rather than an alternative. 
 
 
2.2 Data 
 
When we started working on this evaluation, we immediately faced a fundamental problem. 
There were no usable data on attendance to the trainings, so we would not know which 
 
4 A taxpayer may subsequently register also for VAT, with the same TIN number for the same business, and thus would not be 
included in the definition of ‘new taxpayer’ used here. 
5 Mukama et al. (2017) provide examples of these practical difficulties. 
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taxpayers attended and, as a result, had no way of connecting attendance to declaration 
outcomes. However, this problem was relatively easy to solve: in collaboration with the RRA, 
we simply developed a new registration procedure that would allow the collection of 
attendance data at the time of the training, in digitalised format. This attendance data was 
therefore easily made available for all trainings held in 2017/18 (see list in Table A1). 
Nonetheless, this problem is indicative of the basic obstacles that often prevent any evaluation 
of programmes run by governments in low-income countries – in addition to highlighting the 
importance of ensuring data is available for policy evaluation and monitoring. 
 
In addition to this new source of attendance data, we use two other sources of information: a 
survey and administrative data from tax returns. We can connect these three sources of 
information (survey data, administrative data, and attendance) thanks to unique identifiers, so 
we have all the relevant information for all taxpayers in the survey. Most of our analysis 
focuses on this survey sample (see below). For taxpayers who were not surveyed, we can still 
rely on attendance information and administrative data, so in section 3.5 we test some of our 
results on the full population of new taxpayers. 
 
Our survey includes two rounds: one before (i.e. baseline) and one after the relevant session 
that taxpayers were invited to (i.e. post intervention).6 Attrition between the two rounds is 
about 18 per cent, but it is not correlated to any of our variables, as shown in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. Nonetheless, to make sure our results are not affected, we repeat all our analysis 
with inverse probability weights.7 Our results remain largely consistent, confirming that 
attrition is not a critical threat in our case. Importantly, the first survey round is the only 
baseline information we have, since administrative data is only available after taxpayers have 
registered – and in our case they are all new. Due to budget constraints, we limited the 
sample to 1,000 taxpayers and conducted the survey by phone.8 We focused on the first three 
trainings in the RRA’s training plan (see Table A1): one in Kicukiro, which is a busy district of 
the capital Kigali, and the other two in the smaller towns of Musanze and Rubavu.9 In total, 
over 2,500 taxpayers registered in those three districts by July 2017. To obtain our desired 
sample size, and aware of attrition in survey participation, we randomly selected 1,400 
taxpayers that the survey company would attempt to collect data from, and discarded the 
remaining 1,100. The company then started to call those 1,400 taxpayers, in random order 
and until the desired sample size of 1,000 was reached. We use this random allocation to the 
survey sample as the basis of our IV strategy, which is discussed in more detail in section 3.4. 
 
Our survey included six modules asking detailed questions on: (1) respondents’ 
demographics (e.g. age, gender); (2) characteristics of the business (e.g. number of 
employees, income); (3) reasons to register for a TIN (e.g. obeying the law, access to 
finance); (4) attitudes and perceptions (e.g. on the complexity of the tax system, on tax as a 
social duty); (5) tax knowledge (19 indicators on various aspects of the tax system); and 
(6) information on the RRA’s programme (e.g. in round one, intention to attend; in round 
two, feedback on the training or reasons for not attending).10 Since the two rounds 
happened within a few weeks of each other, and given that the full survey took on average 
42 minutes to complete, in the second round we only collected data on our main variables 
of interest: all those in the modules on knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions, and the 
feedback on training. 
 
6 We obtained permission to conduct this survey from the National Institute of Statistics in Kigali, which also granted our Ethics 
Approval in July 2017. 
7 Results available upon request. 
8    Although doing the survey by phone may have limitations, the distance created with a phone call, as opposed to an 
 interview in person, may have put the respondents in a more comfortable position to answer some sensitive questions about 
their attitudes towards compliance and perceptions about the tax system. 
9 Both these towns are outside the Kigali area and include both rural and urban populations. 
10  Our protocol also included oral consent to take part in the survey and information about confidentiality at the beginning of the 
phone interview. 
12  
Administrative data nicely complements the survey particularly for what concerns compliance 
behaviour. Obtaining honest answers about taxpayers’ compliance is typically one of the 
major challenges in compliance research, especially in studies based on survey data. By 
using administrative data from tax returns, we can directly observe compliance behaviour, 
most importantly compliance with the obligation to declare, but we still cannot observe income 
misreporting. More specifically, we can see the amount declared, but we do not know if it is 
true or an under-reported value.11 We use data from income tax declarations filed between 
January and March 2018, which is the first declaration period for the taxpayers considered 
here, as they are all newly registered. This also implies that we have no baseline 
administrative data for these new taxpayers, as they have never filed a declaration.12 
Furthermore, one of the usual drawbacks of administrative data is the limited range of 
variables available in tax returns, typically only sector and location (or a few others) in addition 
to financial variables related to income, expenses, and the tax base. By matching 
administrative data with our survey, we obtain a unique and rich dataset that includes firms’ 
characteristics, perceptions and attitudes, as well as information on their real compliance 
behaviour. 
 
 
2.3 Empirical strategy 
 
Designing this research project was not straightforward as we had almost no literature to rely 
on (see section 1) and no information on attendance to the programme (see section 2.2) – let 
alone its effectiveness, in Rwanda or with regard to similar programmes elsewhere. It was 
also clear that we would not be able to randomise training sessions, or attendance, as the 
RRA wanted to keep the training open to all new taxpayers who might find it useful (see 
section 2.1). We therefore planned to start by collecting survey and attendance data, to get 
some initial information, and then proceed with an encouragement design in the form of a 
lottery. The lottery was organised for some sessions, to be compared with others with no 
lottery, and taxpayers who were invited to that session and attended would be eligible to win 
one of five monetary prizes.13 This was meant to create an exogenous difference in exposure 
to the training that we could then use to evaluate its impact. In the course of running the 
research, however, we obtained two unexpected results. First, survey data revealed that those 
who attended the programme are not significantly different to those who did not attend, on any 
of the several dimensions we can observe (see section 3.1). Second, the lottery increased 
attendance only marginally in one district,14 but was not effective on average. These two 
findings are somewhat consistent: they suggest that there is an element of randomness in the 
decision to attend this programme, which cannot be much influenced by, at least, monetary 
incentives. Indeed, when we asked non-attendees why they did not attend, the vast majority 
responded with rather ad hoc reasons (32 per cent were busy at work, 30 per cent were sick 
or had a sick family member to care for, 13 per cent forgot), while very few gave answers that 
would make us think attendance is related to unobserved factors (e.g. did not think it would be 
useful, or prefer to learn from other sources). 
11    We could still infer compliance, in terms of income under-reporting, by comparing taxpayers who received a certain intervention 
 to those who did not, for example a letter in the typical message RCT (see Mascagni et al. (2017)). In our case, we can 
compare attendees and non-attendees, building on the good baseline balance we observe and test. 
12  At least, they have not with the TIN they recently obtained.  We cannot observe whether they previously had another TIN, 
which could refer to a completely separate business. 
13  We selected three districts, each with two sessions of which one served as a treatment (with lottery) and one as control (no 
lottery). Taxpayers in lottery sessions were informed in advance that the lottery would take place and that they would be 
eligible if they attended. Five monetary prizes were drawn at the end of the sessions, of the following amounts (net of 
applicable taxes): (1) 102,000 RWF; (2) 59,500 RWF; (3) 42,500 RWF; (4) 34,000 RWF; and (5) 25,500 RWF. Terms and 
Conditions of the lottery were made available to all participants at the beginning of the relevant sessions. More information is 
available from the authors. 
14  The lottery’s effect on attendance in this one district was very small in magnitude, and only borderline significant at the 
10 per cent level. 
13  
Given this information, we decided to adopt a different empirical strategy. Our main results on 
the programme’s effectiveness (sections 3.2 and 3.3) are based on the survey sample. 
Although the training was not randomised, in section 3.1 we present evidence to support our 
view that we still ended up with two groups – attendees and non-attendees – that are largely 
comparable. On the one hand, the advantage of focusing on the survey sample is that we can 
analyse the programme’s effect on all three outcomes of interest: knowledge, perceptions, 
and actual compliance behaviour. We can also rely on a rich set of variables to check for 
balance and to use as controls in our regressions. In particular, in all regressions presented in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3 we control for: owners’ characteristics (i.e. age, gender, level of 
education, whether the owner had a previous business, whether they previously had another 
tax training), characteristics of the business (i.e. size, months since registration, location, 
whether they use emails, whether they have a bank account, PIT/CIT), as well as knowledge 
level and perceptions at baseline.15 Below is the equation we estimate, where Y is the 
outcome of interest after the training (knowledge, perceptions, or compliance – see sections 
3.2 and 3.3), T is attendance to the training programme, and X is the set of control variables 
measured at baseline (t − 1, about one week before the training). 
 
Yit = b0 + b1T + b2Xi(t−1) + ϵi (1) 
On the other hand, however, the survey was not meant to be representative of the population. 
And indeed it is not, particularly in two respects. First, it is over-representative of areas outside 
of Kigali, compared to the reference population of new taxpayers who registered in the 
relevant tax centres but did not take part in the survey.16 We therefore use sampling weights 
throughout the analysis.17 Second, attendance in the survey sample (with weights) is higher 
than in the broader population (see section 3.1). We argue that the main, or perhaps even the 
only, reason for this difference is that the first survey round happened a week before the 
training, and therefore served as a reminder. As mentioned in section 2.1, the RRA’s usual 
invitation process is not expected to reach all intended beneficiaries of the programme, due to 
administrative constraints. The survey instead reached all surveyed participants, who 
therefore were certainly informed about the details of the relevant session. We do not view 
this as a major problem in our analysis, but we exploit this feature in our IV strategy (see 
section 3.4). 
 
Since we are fully aware of the potential drawbacks of an evaluation that is not actually 
randomised, in section 3.4 we carefully address concerns on identification and causality, in 
two ways. First, we use random assignment to the survey as an exogenous instrument for 
attendance. As argued above, the survey acted as a reminder of the training, and indeed 
those who took part were more likely to attend (53 per cent for those who were actually 
surveyed and 39 per cent for those in the list of taxpayers to be surveyed, including 
non-responding taxpayers) than those who did not (14 per cent and 15 per cent).18 This 
 
15  To avoid losing observations due to missing values, we use the method suggested by Rubin (1987) that allows us to retain 
the maximum possible number of observations. 
16    The share of taxpayers from the capital is 64 per cent for the reference population and 47 per cent for the survey sample.   
This is probably due to the fact that taxpayers in the capital are generally busier, therefore have less time to spend on the 
phone and might even be more wary to respond to phone calls from unknown numbers. The survey sample also includes 
relatively more PIT taxpayers, compared to CIT, but this difference is not statistically significant once we use weights to 
account for the population proportion of rural/urban taxpayers (using the normalised difference test from Imbens and Rubin 
(2015)). 
17   We do not find statistically significant differences between the survey sample and the population of new registered 
taxpayers on the only other dimension that are observable at baseline, namely the registration month. As discussed in 
section 2.2, we do not have survey information for the broader population, or much administrative data as these new 
taxpayers have never filed a declaration. 
18  This figure refers to the reference population for the survey: all taxpayers registered from January to July 2017 in the three 
districts that hosted the first three sessions of the programme (see section 2.2). Note that the coaching group is dropped. 
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difference is still present if we compare the two randomly drawn groups of taxpayers who were 
allocated to the survey, whether they were eventually interviewed or not (see section 2.2), and 
those who were left out: respectively 36 per cent and 15 per cent. Exploiting this difference in 
exposure, we can use random assignment to the survey to isolate the exogenous component 
of attendance and evaluate its impact on compliance outcomes in a more rigorous way.19 
Since we do not have survey data for those who are not in the survey sample, we are not able 
to adopt a similar strategy for outcomes related to knowledge and perceptions. Second, we 
use propensity score matching to address any concern that our comparison group may not be 
a suitable counterfactual. By doing this, we are able to approximate a randomised trial and 
therefore provide more rigorous causal estimates (see section 3.4). The results using those 
two strategies, shown in section 3.4, are largely consistent with our main analysis. 
 
Finally, we present two additional elements of analysis that strengthen our understanding of 
taxpayer education in Rwanda. In section 3.3.1 we investigate whether increased knowledge 
is the main mechanism through which attendance to the training increases compliance. In 
section 3.5, we attempt to generalise our results to the whole population of new taxpayers in 
2017/18, beyond the survey sample, looking at the relationship between programme 
attendance and declaration outcomes. 
 
 
3 Results 
 
3.1 Anatomy of taxpayers at baseline and programme attendance 
 
Our survey participants are, as expected, a relatively homogeneous group of mostly small 
businesses. Table 1 reports baseline values of our covariates and outcome variables 
(knowledge and perceptions), from the survey. Over 90 per cent have less than five 
employees and many have no employees (besides the owner). A large proportion does not 
use emails (75 per cent), does not have a bank account (56 per cent), or does not keep proper 
books of accounts (53 per cent). Turning to the outcome variables of interest, it is striking to 
note that knowledge at baseline is very low. On average, taxpayers at baseline responded 
correctly only to about a third of the 19 basic questions we asked about Rwanda’s tax system. 
No respondent gave the right answer to all questions. Interestingly, 37 per cent of the people 
we interviewed did not know what tax type they registered for. These figures clearly confirm 
the importance of organising taxpayer education trainings in Rwanda, as well as the presence 
of large margins for improvement in this area. Low knowledge of the basic parameters of the 
tax system is also consistent with the fact that most new taxpayers in Rwanda fail to make a 
declaration in the first year since registration. For example, amongst taxpayers registered in 
2017, only about 43 per cent filed a declaration, while the majority failed to declare. These 
figures are consistent with those from previous years, showing that this is a persistent issue in 
Rwanda.20 On the other hand, perceptions are generally very good at baseline. Virtually all 
taxpayers agreed with the tax attitude statements we provided, for example on the 
government’s authority to make people pay tax (95 per cent), fairness of the tax system 
(98 per cent), and tax as a social duty (98 per cent). These figures are fully in line with the 
 
19   Using random survey assignment as an IV is a more conservative approach than choosing actual participation in the 
survey. Although the survey company proceeded to phone taxpayers randomly allocated to the survey, whether the 
taxpayer responded or not to the call may be related to unobservable factors. 
20   For example, amongst those registered in 2015, 53 per cent failed to declare. This figure is based on administrative data 
on new registrations from 2015, before this evaluation took place. 
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Rwandan context and the government rhetoric of self-reliance (see section 2.1). However, 
they suggest that we should not expect the programme to have much effect in increasing 
those attitudes further. 
 
Table 1 also reports the average of all key variables, disaggregated by attendance status. The 
last two columns report t-tests and the normalised difference test (∆) to check whether any 
variable is significantly different between these two groups (Imbens and Rubin 2015). 
Although our evaluation was not set up as an experiment, the two groups we aim to compare 
(attendees and non-attendees) are fully comparable at baseline in relation to all outcome 
variables and most covariates.21 Since we control for all covariates at baseline, we do not see 
the very few statistically significant differences reported in Table 1 as a threat to our empirical 
strategy. The fact that these two groups are fully comparable on a wide range of 
characteristics gives us some degree of confidence to use non-attendees as a counterfactual 
group for attendees. However, in section 3.4 we carefully test our results against possible 
empirical threats. 
Table 1 Summary statistics and mean differences by attendance 
 
Baseline results Non-attendees Attendees 
 
 Mean St. dev Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Difference ∆  
 Covariates           
 Age 33.08 9.37 971 32.48 604 34.08 367 -1.61∗∗∗ 0.17  
 Female 0.32 0.47 971 0.31 604 0.34 367 -0.02 0.05  
 No school or primary only 0.19 0.40 971 0.21 604 0.17 367 0.03 -0.08  
 University degree 0.45 0.50 971 0.46 604 0.44 367 0.02 -0.04  
 Owner 0.78 0.42 971 0.76 604 0.80 367 -0.03 0.08  
 CIT 0.47 0.50 971 0.44 604 0.51 367 -0.07 0.13  
 >5 employees 0.09 0.29 971 0.08 604 0.11 367 -0.04∗∗ 0.13  
 Life in months 4.62 2.01 952 4.56 598 4.64 382 -0.08 0.04  
 Located in Kigali 0.49 0.50 951 0.52 569 0.43 382 0.09∗∗∗ -0.17  
 Email use 0.25 0.44 971 0.25 604 0.26 367 -0.01 0.02  
 Bank account 0.44 0.50 971 0.42 604 0.48 367 -0.05 0.11  
 Books of account 0.47 0.50 971 0.46 604 0.50 367 -0.04 0.08  
 Had previous business 0.21 0.41 971 0.20 604 0.22 367 -0.02 0.04  
 Had previous training 0.07 0.25 971 0.07 604 0.06 367 0.01 -0.06  
 Knowledge and perceptions           
 Baseline Knowledge Index 6.35 2.92 971 6.29 604 6.46 367 -0.17 0.06  
 Complexity 0.70 0.46 939 0.69 579 0.72 360 -0.03 0.06  
 Evasion attitude 0.33 0.47 924 0.33 572 0.34 352 -0.01 0.02  
 Fairness 0.98 0.14 932 0.98 578 0.98 354 0.00 -0.00  
 Government authority 0.95 0.21 950 0.95 591 0.96 359 -0.01 0.04  
 Social duty 0.98 0.14 969 0.98 602 0.99 367 -0.01 0.06  
 Public service satisfaction 0.00 1 948 -0.04 588 0.06 360 -0.09 0.09  
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Observations are weighted by sampling weights.  T–tests are computed on 
the Difference across the two groups. ∆ is the normalised difference from Imbens and Rubin (2015), equal to the 
difference in means scaled by the square root of the average of the two within-group variances. St. dev – standard 
deviation. Obs. – observations. 
 
Table 2 shows attendance rates across various relevant samples. The first column refers to 
the survey sample (with weights), which is the basis of our main results. The second column 
shows the out-of-survey sample that, together with the survey sample, makes up the 
reference population for the survey (i.e. all new registrations from January to July in the 
relevant districts, as explained in section 2.2). Finally, the third column shows attendance 
rates for all sessions organised in 2017/18, for the universe of new taxpayers. All attendance 
figures are disaggregated by urban (i.e. Kigali, the capital) and more rural districts (although 
some areas outside of the capital are urban). The pattern across all samples is similar, in that 
rural areas tend to have higher attendance than the capital. However, as anticipated in 
section 2.3, the survey had a big impact in increasing attendance amongst those who took  
21 There are no normalised differences (∆) greater than 0.25, the benchmark Imbens and Rubin (2015) suggest when testing 
 for balance. 
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part. The difference between the survey and out-of-survey samples is statistically 
significant and, we argue, due primarily to a reminder effect (see sections 2.3 and 3.4). 
Importantly, attendance is generally very low – with many taxpayers failing to take up the 
programme. 
Table 2 Take-up of training programme by samples 
 
 Survey samplea Out-of-survey sampleb Whole sample 
Attendance 45.8% 15.3% 17.6% 
Urban 42.1% 13.4% 15.5% 
Rural 49.1% 17.8% 23.7% 
Observations 952 1,580 15,009 
a Survey sample consists of 952 taxpayers for which baseline data and 
attendance data are available. This number is lower than the 1,000 who took 
part in the survey because for a small portion of surveyed taxpayers we could 
not connect survey data with attendance data. b Out-of-survey sample includes 
taxpayers who are never surveyed, either at the baseline or at the endline. 
Urban refers to tax centres in Kigali, Rural all the others. 
 
 
3.2 Programme impacts on knowledge and perceptions 
 
Having presented some evidence on the comparability of the two groups of attendees and 
non-attendees, we proceed to evaluate the effectiveness of the programme as discussed in 
section 2.3. Table 3 shows the programme’s impact on taxpayer knowledge.22 The first two 
columns show that attendance to the programme is associated with a 27 per cent 
probability that taxpayers will experience any increase in knowledge between the two 
survey rounds. This effect is highly significant and its magnitude does not change whether 
we include control variables (column two) or not (column one), which is consistent with the 
baseline balance shown in Table 1. Columns three and four show the percentage gain of the 
knowledge index, which gives equal weight to all of our 19 indicators. In this case, the 
dependent variable is the ratio of the difference in knowledge between the two rounds to 
baseline knowledge. Attendees experience on average a 56 per cent increase in knowledge 
after the training, compared to those who did not attend. Finally, we use the actual index, 
re-scaled from 1 to 10, as dependent variable – once again showing relatively large 
increases in knowledge for attendees, especially considering the very low baseline level of 
the re-scaled index (about 3). 
 
Table A3 in the Appendix also provides some insights on heterogeneous effects across four 
dimensions of interest: gender, location in Kigali, level of education, and taxpayer size. It 
shows that taxpayers in Kigali tend to experience higher knowledge gains, while large 
taxpayers have smaller ones, consistent with the fact that they have more resources to 
navigate the tax system (e.g. dedicated accountants, consultants). 
 
Turning to perceptions, Table 4 reports results on combined indexes that bring together 
statements from our perceptions module that refer to similar topics. Table A5 in the Appendix 
reports the statements used to build each one of these indexes. For example, the complexity 
index brings together the two following statements: ‘It is difficult to file an income tax 
declaration’ and ‘It is difficult to get in touch with RRA officials to get information’. This binary 
index takes the value of 1 if the respondent agreed with at least one of these two statements. 
This is also the only one of all perception indexes that shows a statistically significant 
 
22  The number of observations in these regressions is lower than the 1,000 target for sample size (see section 2.2) because of 
attrition between the two survey sounds. Attrition is not related to any of our observed variables, so the two groups of 
attendees and non-attendees remain balanced. 
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Table 3 Training impact on tax knowledge 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Increase Increase Gain Gain Index Index 
Training 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) 
Baseline knowledge  -0.09∗∗∗ 
(0.01) 
 -0.41∗∗∗ 
(0.04) 
 0.53∗∗∗ 
(0.03) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Mean of Y 0.714 0.714 0.571 0.571 4.538 4.538 
R2 0.092 0.206 0.069 0.359 0.150 0.508 
Observations 820 820 815 815 820 820 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Increase is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the post-pre knowledge score difference is positive. Gain is the 
ratio of the difference over the 0-10 pre-training score. Index is the post training knowledge 
score rescaled over 0-10 range. Covariates used are those indicated in section 2.3. All 
regressions are weighted by sampling weights. 
 
difference for attendees, after the training. Attendees are about 10 per cent less likely to agree 
with the complexity statements after having attended, which is consistent with the fact that they 
now have higher knowledge and better understand how to navigate the tax system. This result 
is confirmed when we look at individual indicators on attendance, instead of the combined 
index.23 The programme does not seem to affect other perceptions, which perhaps should not 
come as a surprise given the very high levels already observed at baseline (see section 3.1). 
Table 4 Impacts of training on perceptions indexes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Complexity Evasion Fairness Govt. authority Social duty 
Training -0.093∗∗ -0.005 0.003 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) 
Baseline 0.320∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.010 
 (0.044) (0.034) (0.008) (0.019) (0.006) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of Y 0.693 0.316 0.940 0.933 0.979 
Observations 815 811 810 817 820 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are 
marginal effects from probit regressions computed at the mean of the explanatory 
variables. The control group are taxpayers who did not attend the training. Perceptions 
outcomes are indexes which range from 0 (disagree) to 1 (agree). Covariates used are 
those indicated in section 2.3. All regressions are weighted by sampling weights. 
 
 
3.3 Programme impacts on compliance 
 
Having shown in section 3.2 that the programme had large and significant effects on 
knowledge and, to a lesser extent, on perceptions around complexity, we now ask whether  
these benefits translate into better compliance outcomes. Compliance is a broad concept that 
encompasses various specific aspects, including registration, filing a declaration, doing so in 
time, reporting the correct amount of tax base, and paying in full and on time. It is therefore 
important to consider multiple outcomes in the analysis. Here we focus on three aspects that 
are particularly relevant to new taxpayers: the probability to declare, the probability to nilfile, and 
the amount of tax declared.24 The columns of Table 5 correspond to these three outcomes of 
interest.25 
 
23 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
24  We also checked if the programme had any effect on the probability of making a pre-payment following the declaration. 
Pre-payments are payments on account, based on the previous declaration’s tax amount and divided in four payments of equal  
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Table 5 Impact of training and coaching on tax outcomes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Declare Declare Nilfile Nilfile Log tax Log tax 
Training 0.140∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ -0.097∗ -0.158∗∗∗ 1.205∗ 1.146∗∗∗ 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.056) (0.060) (0.623) (0.408) 
Coaching 0.068 0.099∗ -0.068 -0.229∗∗ 0.766 1.547∗∗ 
 (0.050) (0.056) (0.080) (0.091) (0.916) (0.772) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Knowledge/perceptions No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 971 969 393 393 364 364 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are marginal 
effects from probit (1-4) and tobit (5-6) regressions evaluated at mean. The control group 
comprises taxpayers who did not receive any educational input. We control for taxpayers who 
received a call under the coaching option (see section 3.3.2). Declare and Nilfile are dummy 
variables with value 1 if the taxpayers declared and nilfile, respectively. Log tax is the log(tax+1) 
transformation of the raw tax amount variable. Covariates and Knowledge and Perceptions used 
are those indicated in section 2.3. All regressions weighted by sampling weights. 
 
The training seems to have a relatively large and statistically significant effect on the 
probability to make a declaration, which increases by about 10 percentage points once 
controls are included (column two). Although we do not have a baseline value for this sample 
(this is the first time they are required to declare, as explained in sections 2.1 and 2.2), we 
know from previous years’ administrative data that over half of new taxpayers typically fail to 
make a tax declaration. For our comparison group, the declaration rate is 34 per cent.26 
Compared to this number, an increase of ten percentage points corresponds to a 30 per cent 
increase in the probability to declare, which we attribute to the programme (see section 3.4). 
 
As mentioned in section 1, bringing taxpayers into the habit of paying taxes has been shown 
to be crucial to their future compliance (Dunning et al. 2017) and is therefore an important 
policy impact. Data from the RRA’s database on taxpayers who registered in 2015 is also 
highly suggestive that habit plays an important role in determining their probability to declare. 
A new taxpayer who files a declaration in the first year of operation (2015) had 55 per cent 
probability to make a tax declaration in 2016 and an 86 per cent probability to file again in 
2017, conditional on having filed the previous year. In comparison, taxpayers who fail to 
declare in the first year (2015) have a negligible probability (less than 1 per cent) of filing a 
declaration in any of the following two years. 
 
Columns three and four of Table 5 look at the probability of nil-filing. This is a common 
phenomenon in low-income countries,27 which essentially involves filing a declaration with nil 
amounts of income and, as a result, zero tax liability. While this could be the reflection of poor 
business performance, especially for new taxpayers, a separate study on this topic suggests 
that it is also partly related to non-compliance.28 The programme seems to reduce the 
probability of nil-filing by about 15 per cent, once controls are included. 
 
amount that need to be done in advance throughout the year, towards the following year’s declaration. We find no effect of the 
programme on the probability of making a pre-payment. This is probably due to the fact that pre-payment information is only 
available for those who made a positive tax declaration, which is a small sample, as others would not be required to make a 
pre-payment. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
25  Note that the sample size in Table 5 is larger, because we do not have a problem with attrition. For example, we can 
observe the post-training outcome of ‘declare’ for all 1,000 survey participants, while we can observe ‘nilfile’ only for those 
who declared and ‘log tax’ only for those with a positive tax amount. 
26  The declaration rate in our survey sample is lower than in the whole population because the survey included proportionally 
more taxpayers in rural areas, even once we include weights, and they have a lower probability to declare. 
27 For example, see Almunia et al. (2017); Mascagni and Mengistu (2016); Mascagni, Monkam and Nell (2016). 
28 This study is not yet published. 
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Next, we check whether attendance to the programme also affects the amount of tax paid. As 
mentioned in section 1, in principle taxpayer education could either increase or decrease the 
amount of tax paid. Columns five and six of Table 5 suggest that the programme had a large 
positive impact on the log of tax payable, essentially doubling it for taxpayers who attended. In 
section 3.4 we put this finding, as well as others, to further scrutiny and test its robustness to 
empirical threats. 
 
Finally, as in section 3.2, we check for heterogeneous effects across the same variables. 
Table A6 in the Appendix shows that women and large firms seem to experience larger 
increases in declaration rates, while there do not seem to be significant heterogeneous effects 
on nil-filing and the tax amount, possibly because of a smaller sample size. 
 
 
3.3.1 Is knowledge the channel? 
 
Having looked into programme impacts on knowledge and compliance, a question naturally 
arises: is knowledge the main channel for better compliance outcomes? To address this 
question, we use attendance to the programme as an instrumental variable for knowledge 
increases. The purpose here is to isolate the effect of knowledge on tax outcomes that is due 
to attendance. Although one could rightfully argue that attendance is not an exogenous 
variable, since it was not randomised, we are somewhat encouraged to proceed based on the 
balance tests reported in section 3.1 and the further scrutiny of section 3.4. We would also 
argue that attendance is more exogenous than knowledge increases, which are more likely to 
be related to unobservable factors. The first stage regressions show that attendance is indeed 
a relevant instrument as it displays a significant coefficient.29 Although in principle attendance 
might also affect compliance outcomes through other channels, in our case the exclusion 
restriction is also satisfied. When included in a regression similar to the second stage one, our 
IV (attendance) is not statistically significant.30 Somewhat supporting this result, in section 3.2 
we have shown that attendance generally does not affect perceptions, except for those on the 
complexity of the tax system that are more closely related to knowledge. These results are 
suggestive that attendance affects compliance only or primarily through knowledge, rather 
than other channels, although of course this argument remains debatable. 
 
With these important caveats in mind, Table 6 provides suggestive evidence that increases in 
knowledge may indeed be an important channel for the programme’s impact on declaration 
rates. As far as other compliance outcomes are concerned, Table A7 in the Appendix shows 
that the coefficients on nil-filing or the tax amount have the right sign and a comparable 
magnitude to those reported in Table 5 but they are not statistically significant, possibly 
because of larger standard errors in the IV estimation. While these results are to be taken with 
caution, they are somewhat suggestive that increased knowledge may play an important role 
as a channel to better compliance outcomes. An alternative potential channel would be, for 
example, related to enforcement and deterrence perceptions that might be affected by the 
programme, since it is run by RRA staff. However, deterrence is unlikely to be a channel since 
the programme did not seem to affect perceptions on deterrence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29  Results from the first stage regressions are omitted for simplicity. The coefficient on our instrument is 0.12 when using 
knowledge increase and 0.26 when using knowledge gain, and they are both significant at the 1 per cent level. 
30 In such auxiliary regression, the p-value of the IV (attendance) is 0.160 for knowledge increase and 0.250 for knowledge gain. 
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Table 6 Impacts of knowledge on declaration probability – IV strategy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Increase Increase Gain Gain 
Knowledge 0.50∗∗∗ 0.23 0.24∗∗∗ 0.11 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes 
Knowledge/perceptions No Yes No Yes 
Mean of Y 0.411 0.411 0.413 0.413 
Observations 700 700 696 696 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The 
instrument is attendance to the training. Increase is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the post-pre knowledge score difference is positive. 
Gain is the ratio of the difference over the 0-10 pre-training score. Exclusion 
restric- tion holds: p-value of the IV in a regression with Knowledge is 
16 per cent for Increase and 25 pr cent for Gain. Covariates used are those 
indicated in section 2.3. All regressions weighted by sampling weights. 
 
 
3.3.2 A comparison with an alternative one-to-one coaching option 
 
As mentioned briefly in section 2.1, we compare the main RRA education programme with a 
possible alternative: the one-to-one coaching programme. The motivation for piloting this 
potential alternative is twofold. First, when we collected feedback on the programme, in the 
second round of our survey, many taxpayers signalled that they would benefit from some 
form of complement to the training programme. About 40 per cent of attendees mentioned 
that the session was too short, and that there was not sufficient time for questions. Second, 
related studies have shown that a more intensive and personalised approach might be 
beneficial. In the related financial education literature, personalised counselling is shown to 
be a useful complement to more standard financial education, to increase real financial 
outcomes (Carpena et al. 2015). The very scarce literature on this aspect of tax does not 
seem to be fully conclusive and it only concerns high-income countries (Chetty and Saez 
2013; Gangl et al. 2014). 
 
Unlike the RRA’s main taxpayer education programme, we could randomise the coaching 
option, as this was a small pilot of a new initiative. We randomly selected 275 taxpayers, using 
strata (gender, location in/out of Kigali, size, and baseline knowledge) from the group of 
non-attendees, so that they are fully comparable with the relevant control group (i.e. 
non-attendees who were not selected for the coaching option) – as confirmed by balance 
test.31 RRA staff called the selected taxpayers during the declaration period, after the second 
round of the survey was carried out, so we only have post-treatment outcomes from 
administrative data, while we still have all the baseline survey data. Capacity constraints 
played a crucial role here, as this pilot was quite burdensome for the tax administration, even if 
it only involved a relatively small number of taxpayers. As a result, RRA officials could reach 
only 160 taxpayers in both rounds. The low compliance with the treatment and lacking records 
are mostly due to capacity constraints on the RRA’s side, as the staff allocated to this task 
were few and spread thinly across a number of other duties. To take this issue into account, 
Table 7 reports results on the coaching effect on all compliance outcomes considered in 
section 3.3, using both ITT (intention to treat) and TOT (treatment on treated). The latter uses 
the random allocation to the treatment group as an IV for treatment status (i.e. the 160 that 
were effectively called in both rounds). Our results show that the coaching option does not 
seem to be very effective in improving compliance outcomes, especially compared to the main 
 
 
31  Balance tests are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. In addition, based on the evidence of section 3.1, we would argue that 
the coaching treatment and control groups are also comparable with attendees, although we do not directly compare these 
groups. 
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programme’s effects (see Table 5).32 This is potentially due to low compliance with the 
treatment, both because of the limited number of taxpayers who were actually reached 
(though this is taken into account with TOT) and the fact that some of those reached did not 
have any questions or only spent a very short time on the call. For example, 43 per cent of 
taxpayers contacted in the first round did not have any tax-related questions, while as many as 
68 per cent did not have any in the second round. 
 
Although we received anecdotal reports that taxpayers appreciated the coaching phone call, 
our results do not suggest that this pilot was successful. Besides our estimation results, 
administrative constraints are an important consideration in terms of the feasibility of a 
potential scale-up of this option. With current staffing, reaching 160 taxpayers represented a 
relatively large burden on the departments involved so it makes any further scale-up 
particularly unadvisable. The RRA could still adopt this more personalised approach in specific 
and selected cases as a complement to the main education programme, which seems to be 
more effective and allows reaching out to a much larger pool of beneficiaries. 
Table 7 Impacts of coaching on tax outcomes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ITT declare TOT declare ITT nilfile TOT nilfile ITT log tax TOT log tax 
Coaching 0.02 0.03 -0.13∗ -0.13 0.36 1.09 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.70) (0.93) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.312  0.352  0.283 
Observations 618 618 236 236 216 216 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coaching group is 
compared to control group, i.e. taxpayers not attending. Training group is dropped. Covariates used 
are those indicated in section 2.3. All regressions weighted by sampling weights. ITT – intention to 
treat; TOT – treatment on treated. 
 
 
3.4 Addressing endogeneity 
 
Although we have argued that our groups are comparable and balanced (see section 3.1), we 
are fully aware of the limitations of a design that is not randomised. While we are confident 
that there are no significant differences between attendees and non-attendees in the wide 
range of variables we can observe, including perceptions and knowledge, one could still argue 
that there are other variables that are unobserved and might drive differences between those 
groups, or that they are not fully comparable. To address these concerns, we adopt two 
strategies: an instrumental variable (IV) for attendance and propensity score matching (PSM). 
 
As far as the IV strategy is concerned, we exploit the fact that allocation to the survey sample 
was randomised (see section 2.2) and that the survey itself resulted in an increase in 
attendance (see sections 2.3 and 3.1). We argue the survey resulted in higher attendance 
simply because of a reminder effect, as there was no other incentive inherent in our 
questionnaire. Importantly, the survey was administered by an independent company, and not 
by RRA employees. In addition, the fact that our monetary incentive, through the lottery 
described in section 2.3, was not effective in increasing attendance shows that participation to 
the programme is not easily manipulated, beyond a simple reminder effect. Since here we rely 
on a larger number of observations, including taxpayers who were not surveyed, we can only 
 
32   Note that in Table 7 we have dropped the group of attendees, which is why the the number of observations is smaller than in 
Table 5. However, the results are still not statistically significant if we included them in the regression, while controlling for their 
attendance status. 
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use the IV strategy to explore the programme’s effect on compliance outcomes.33 In line with 
the exclusion restriction, we show that our instrumental variable (random assignment to the 
survey sample) does not directly affect our outcomes of interest (see Table A8 in the 
Appendix). However, the first stage regression, reported in column one of Table 8, confirms 
that it significantly increases the probability to attend the programme, by a substantial 22 
percentage points once we control for our full set of covariates. Columns two, three and four 
report the second stage regressions, where attendance is instrumented and the dependent 
variables are our three compliance outcomes. The results on the probability to declare remain 
statistically significant and increase in magnitude, suggesting that, if anything, there might 
have been a downward bias in the main results. Results on the other two outcomes (nil-filing 
and log tax) lose their significance. This may be due to the larger standard errors that are 
inherent to the two-stage IV estimation, coupled with a lower number of observations available 
for these outcomes (i.e. only those taxpayers who filed a declaration) – or it could be a 
genuine reflection of ineffectiveness of the programme on these outcomes, once a more 
rigorous estimation method is used. 
Table 8 Impacts of random allocation to survey and invitation – IV strategy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1st stage Declare Nilfile Log tax 
IV Assign. survey 0.22∗∗∗ 
(0.02) 
   
Training  0.18∗∗ 0.09 -0.53 
  (0.09) (0.15) (1.68) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.09 0.22 0.03 0.01 
F-stat  137.85 46.57 42.57 
Observations 2,378 2,378 907 860 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. IV Assign. survey is the instrument, referring to a 
dummy for whether the taxpayer is randomly assigned to the 
attempt to survey group. Coaching group has been dropped. 
Covariates used are those indicated in section 2.3. 
 
Secondly, we use a PSM estimator, where the propensity score represents the probability of 
being assigned to a treatment (i.e. attendance to the programme), given a set of covariates. 
There are two assumptions for PSM to be valid. The first one is unconfoundedness, which 
requires that all confounding factors be included in the set of covariates used to calculate the 
propensity score. We cannot directly test this assumption, but we use a very large set of 
covariates that capture the most important potential sources of concern, including attitudes 
and knowledge at baseline, as well as taxpayer and business characteristics.34 The second 
assumption is overlap (or common support), which requires that individuals with the same 
score can be either attendees or non-attendees, as if a randomised experiment was carried 
out. As shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix, this assumption holds in our case.35 Importantly, 
since with PSM we are only focusing on the survey sample, we can report results on all 
outcomes of interest: knowledge, perceptions (both reported in Table 9), and compliance 
outcomes (Table 10). All tables report the programme effects using three different matching 
algorithms, which also serves as a further test for robustness.36 The tables also report two 
 
33 We have post-treatment information on knowledge and perceptions only for survey participants. 
34  The variables used to calculate the propensity score are: the set of covariates as indicated in section 2.3, as well as the 
baseline values of knowledge and perceptions indexes. To avoid reducing the sample due to missing values, we use the 
method suggested by Rubin (1987). 
35 The average propensity score of non-attendees is is 46 per cent while for attendees it is 52 per cent, i.e. very close. 
36  These are: (1) Nearest-neighbour matching with replacement, where the taxpayer from the non-attendees group is chosen as 
a matching partner for a trained taxpayer that is closest in terms of the propensity score. With replacement, an untrained  
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measures of the quality of matching, which confirm its validity.37 In line with the relevant 
literature, we use the common support option and bootstrap standard errors.38 
Table 9 Training effect on knowledge and perceptions – PSM 
 
Increase Gain Index Complexity 
Panel A: N-N matching with replacement 
Training 0.28∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.18) (0.05) 
Common support 818 813 818 813 
Ps-R2 matched 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.031 
LR chi2 matched 34.98 34.54 34.98 34.06 
Panel B: Radius matching with caliper 5% 
Training 0.25∗∗∗ 
(0.03) 
0.57∗∗∗ 
(0.07) 
1.25∗∗∗ 
(0.12) 
-0.10∗∗∗ 
(0.04) 
Common support 818 813 818 813 
Ps-R2 matched 0.032 0.002 0.002 0.002 
LR chi2 matched 1.76 1.91 1.76 1.91 
Panel C: Kernel matching 
Training 0.25∗∗∗ 
(0.03) 
0.57∗∗∗ 
(0.07) 
1.25∗∗∗ 
(0.12) 
-0.10∗∗∗ 
(0.04) 
Common support 818 813 818 813 
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
LR chi2 matched 1.74 1.87 1.74 1.87 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are in 
parentheses are from 99 bootstrapped repetitions. Note that the 
Ps-R2 unmatched is always 0.042 and the LR chi2 unmatched is 
always 47.40∗∗∗. Increase is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
post-pre knowledge score difference is positive. Gain is the ratio of 
the difference over the 0-10 pre-training score. Index is the 
post-training knowledge score rescaled over 0-10 range. Complexity is 
the average of two complexity costs indexes. 
 
The results of the PSM estimation are largely comparable, and in some cases extremely 
similar, to the main ones reported in sections 3.2 and 3.3. The magnitude and significance of 
the programme’s effects on knowledge and perceptions remain essentially unchanged. The 
same is true for the declaration probability and nil-filing, which are still statistically significant 
albeit with a slightly smaller coefficient. The effect on the log tax amount instead loses its 
significance, although the magnitude and sign of the coefficient are still in line with our main 
result. The fact that the results from the PSM estimation are very similar to our main analysis 
supports its robustness. Importantly, it also confirms that the groups we were comparing 
before matching are very similar, as we argued in section 3.1. 
 
Taken together, the results from the IV and PSM estimation show that our strongest result is 
the programme’s positive impact on declaration rates, which stands up particularly well to 
further scrutiny. The PSM results also support our results on knowledge, perceptions on 
taxpayer is used more than once as a match; (2) Radius caliper matching with a radius of 0.5, where applying caliper 
matching means that a taxpayer from the untrained group is chosen as a matching partner for a treated taxpayer that lies 
within a given distance of the propensity score (i.e. caliper) and thus is closest in terms of propensity score; and 
(3) Epanechnikov kernel matching with bandwidth 0.06. Kernel matching (and local linear matching) are non-parametric 
matching estimators that use weighted averages of (nearly) all individuals in the control group to construct the 
counterfactual outcome. How many individuals are chosen from the control group depends on the kernel function. 
Weights depend on the distance between each individual from the control group and the participant observation for which 
the counterfactual is estimated. 
37  As explained in Sianesi (2004), after matching there should be no additional systematic differences in the distribution of 
covariates between the two groups and therefore the pseudo-R2 should be fairly low. The likelihood ratio test should be 
rejected in all cases when matching is applied, as is the case in all panels. 
38  The common support option requires that we only include the subset of observations in the comparison group that is 
comparable to the treatment group (Dehejia and Wahba 1999). Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) stress that a 
violation of the common support condition is a major source of evaluation bias. 
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Table 10 Impact of training on tax outcomes – PSM 
 
Declare Nilfile Log tax 
Panel A: N-N matching with replacement 
Training 0.13∗∗∗ -0.15∗ 1.09 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.92) 
Common support 807 324 303 
Ps-R2 matched 0.022 0.099 0.105 
LR chi2 matched 26.07 54.84∗∗∗ 55.19∗∗∗ 
Panel B: Radius matching with caliper 5% 
Training 0.08∗∗ -0.12∗∗ 0.96 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.70) 
Common support 807 324 303 
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.047 0.056 
LR chi2 matched 2.36 26.02 29.37 
Panel C: Kernel matching 
Training 0.08∗∗ -0.12∗∗ 0.94 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.71) 
Common support 807 324 303 
Ps-R2 matched 0.002 0.046 0.056 
LR chi2 matched 2.14 25.78 29.18 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,  ∗∗∗ p  <  0.01.  Standard errors 
in parentheses are from 99 bootstrapped repetitions. 
Note that the Ps-R2 unmatched is always 0.11 and the 
LR chi2 unmatched is always 44.45∗∗. Coaching group is 
dropped from the analysis. The control group consists of 
taxpayers who did not receive any educational input. 
Declare and Nilfile are dummy variables with value 1 if 
the taxpayers declared and nilfile, respectively. Log tax is 
the log(tax+1) transformation of the raw tax amount 
variable. 
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complexity, and nil-filing. The result on log tax instead does not hold in the IV or PSM 
estimation, which might be due to bias in our main analysis or to the smaller sample size we 
can count on for this outcome. 
 
 
3.5 Population-wide effects of the programme 
 
Our results so far have shown large increases in knowledge and in declaration rates that are 
robust to potential empirical threats – while the results on nil-filing and tax amount do not 
stand up as well to further scrutiny (see section 3.4). Therefore in this section, we focus on our 
strongest compliance result, on the declaration probability, and address the issue of external 
validity, at least for what concerns the population of taxpayers in Rwanda beyond our survey 
sample and its reference population.39 In other words, do our results hold when we look at the 
whole population of new taxpayers in Rwanda? For those registered in 2017, we can observe 
both attendance status and whether they declared or not, from administrative data (see 
section 2.2). We can therefore link the two and analyse the programmes’ relation with the 
probability to declare, for the universe of new taxpayers. However, we have a very limited set 
of covariates for the whole population – essentially, only those available in the registrations 
database.40 These ‘administrative covariates’ are: whether the taxpayer registered as a 
corporation (CIT) or as an unincorporated business (PIT), the months since registration, the 
months since the training, and fixed effects for the tax centre where they registered and where 
they were invited to attend the programme. 
Based on these data, Table 11 reports the programme’s effect as estimated once we control 
for the few covariates available. The first column of Table 11 shows that the coefficient of the 
training in the survey sample, controlling for the smaller set of administrative covariates, is 
very similar to the one reported in Table 5 (column two), where we control for a much larger 
set of covariates from the survey. This gives us some confidence that omitting those 
covariates might not result in a serious bias in our estimates. Comparing the programme’s 
coefficient in the survey sample (column one) and in the population (column two), clearly 
shows that the effect size is much larger in the latter. This difference might be due to a 
different composition in terms of taxpayers based in Kigali as opposed to those based in other 
regions, outside of the capital (we call the latter ‘rural’, even though some of these areas have 
urban centres). In particular, the survey, as well as its reference population, is more 
representative of ‘rural’ areas than the whole population, where Kigali represents a much 
larger share of new taxpayers.41 To improve comparability, we separate both the survey 
sample and the population into rural (columns three and four) and urban areas (columns five 
and six). Even using those more comparable sub-groups, the effect size in the survey sample 
are smaller than in the broader population, although the direction of the effect is the same. 
The programme still increases the probability to declare, but this effect seems to be larger in 
the broader population than in the survey sample – both in rural and in urban areas. Based on 
this comparison, we might consider the effects identified in our main analysis (section 3.3) as 
a lower bound for the more general effect of the programme. Table 11 suggests that the 
programme increases declaration rates by 30 per cent in the broader population, as opposed 
to about 11 per cent in the survey sample. 
 
39  As mentioned in section 2.2, the reference population for our survey is composed of taxpayers who registered from January 
to July in the three tax centres included in the survey. In contrast, in this section we look at the total population of all 
taxpayers registered in any tax centre at any time in 2017. 
40  Note that, since many new taxpayers fail to file, we do not have variables from the tax declaration for all relevant taxpayers 
here, although we can observe the outcome of interest for everyone – whether they file or not. 
41  The survey’s reference population is new taxpayers registered from January to July in the three relevant tax centres (see 
section 2.2). The sampling weights that we describe in section 2.3 simply bring the survey sample in line with the 
reference population, which however is still more representative of ‘rural’ areas than the whole population. 
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Table 11 Impact of training on probability to declare 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Survey All Survey rural All rural Survey urban All urban 
Training 0.110∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.077 0.332∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 
 (0.040) (0.012) (0.052) (0.020) (0.054) (0.015) 
Admin. covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax centre FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 971 14,994 508 4,051 461 10,942 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Coefficients are marginal effects from probit regression computed at the mean of covariates. 
All regressions are weighted by sampling weights. FEs – fixed effects. 
 
 
Although the results on nil-filing and tax amount are weaker, we also check the programme’s 
relation with those other compliance outcomes in the broader population – since for those too 
we have all the necessary data, although with the same smaller set of administrative 
covariates mentioned above. Tables A9 and A10 in the Appendix report, respectively, 
comparable results to Table 11 but for nil-filing and tax amount. As for the declaration 
probability, the results on the other two compliance outcomes are very similar once we 
include administrative covariates instead of the survey covariates. Perhaps the most 
interesting result here is on the tax amount, which seems to significantly increase for 
attendees in the broader population. Although the results on tax amount were not significant 
in the IV and PSM estimation (section 3.4), they also suffered the most from a small sample 
size. A larger sample size might allow for more precise and statistically significant estimates, 
in the presence of actual effects. The fact that, once we use a larger sample, attendance to 
the programme is associated with higher tax amounts, combined with the apparent absence 
of self-selection (see section 3.1), suggests that there might be an effect on the level of tax 
payable, in addition to declaration rates. However, these results need to be taken with caution 
as we cannot test their robustness further. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
This paper aims to shed light on the effectiveness of taxpayer education, a topic that has so 
far been largely ignored in the literature. More specifically, we evaluate a taxpayer education 
programme run by the Rwanda Revenue Authority and offered to all new taxpayers. We are 
particularly interested to explore the programme’s effects on knowledge, perceptions, and 
compliance outcomes. To investigate this question, we rely on a unique dataset that matches 
information from a survey and from administrative tax records. By doing this, we can 
overcome some of the common problems both of surveys (e.g. difficulty to measure 
compliance) and of administrative data (e.g. lack of comprehensive information on taxpayers’ 
characteristics). Although we could not randomise attendance to the main programme of 
interest, we perform several tests that give us confidence that our results are robust and 
unbiased. In addition to showing balance across a wide range of observable variables 
(section 3.1), we also put our results to closer scrutiny through IV and PSM strategies 
(section 3.4). 
 
Considering both our main analysis (sections 3.2 and 3.3) and our further tests (section 3.4), 
our results show that taxpayer education has a large impact on knowledge and on the 
probability to declare in the first year since registration. The programme’s effects on those two 
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outcomes stand up particularly well to further scrutiny, therefore representing our strongest 
results. Still, we provide some evidence that the programme likely also affects perceptions 
about complexity of the tax system and other compliance outcomes, namely nil-filing and the 
tax amount. The fact that the latter effect is particularly weak is in line with the only article on 
this topic (Chetty and Saez 2013), which shows no effect on reported income for an education 
programme in the United States. However, as discussed in section 3.5, it might also be due to 
the smaller number of observations we have for this outcome. These results highlight the 
importance of looking at multiple aspects of compliance, especially in contexts like Rwanda 
where failure to declare and nil-filing are highly prevalent phenomena. Our result on 
declaration rates is particularly important in light of recent evidence on the role of habit in 
compliance (Dunning et al. 2017). When taxpayers register with the RRA but fail to make a 
tax declaration, they are less likely to comply in the future and to engage in any meaningful 
way in debates around tax issues – with potential implications for the relation between taxation 
and accountability. We plan to explore the role of habit in further research, by looking at 
taxpayer behaviour in subsequent years after registration. 
 
Furthermore, we document dramatically low levels of tax knowledge in Rwanda. The majority 
of new taxpayers have a very low understanding of the basic parameters of the tax system, as 
we show in section 3.1. While this is in line with previous evidence on taxpayer knowledge 
(see section 1), we use a more accurate measure of knowledge, which is an original 
contribution to this literature. One immediate recommendation for the RRA would be to 
provide some basic information to taxpayers at the point of registration, for example stating 
clearly what taxes they registered for and what are the related obligations. In section 3.3.1, we 
also report some suggestive evidence that knowledge could be an important channel for the 
programme’s impact on compliance. In addition, we would argue, even though somewhat 
more speculatively, that increased knowledge is likely to be beneficial more broadly to 
increase taxpayers’ confidence to resist corrupt practices by tax officials, to engage in a 
constructive dialogue around tax, and ultimately to have better views on the transparency and 
integrity of the tax system. 
 
In terms of policy, our results provide three important insights. First, the main objective of 
taxpayer education programmes should not necessarily be only immediate revenue gains, but 
also a change in taxpayer habits. In the case of new taxpayers, this would mean bringing 
them into the habit of filing tax declarations – in addition to discouraging nil-filing and reporting 
income in full. In section 3.3 we show that taxpayers who file a declaration in the first year of 
registration are much more likely to continue doing so, compared to those who fail to file in the 
first year. Along similar lines, the RRA also runs other programmes, such as tax clubs in 
schools (see Mascagni and Santoro (2018)), that aim to build a tax culture from a young age. 
Although these initiatives are unlikely to yield immediate revenue gains, we believe they can 
play a crucial role to increase and consolidate compliance in the longer term. As such, 
investing in taxpayer education seems to be a sensible strategy – as part of a broader range 
of measures to improve compliance. 
 
Second, more specifically to the RRA’s main taxpayer education programme, our results 
suggest that it is highly effective, but more could be done to increase its reach, which is 
currently quite limited (section 3.1). This might imply increasing capacity in the department in 
charge of taxpayer education initiatives (in the RRA’s case, the Taxpayer Services 
department), as we also show that they are typically under-resourced (see section 3.3.2 and 
Mascagni and Santoro (2018)). Relatedly, our pilot of the coaching programme (section 3.3.2) 
suggests that a more personalised option is currently ineffective and hardly scalable. It should 
only be adopted for a selected group of taxpayers, or ad hoc based on specific needs, rather 
than be considered as an alternative to the main education programme. 
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Last but not least, we recommend continuing to collect information on attendance beyond the 
life of this evaluation study. Carrying out such a study with the data previously available would 
have been impossible, although a relatively simple fix allowed us to obtain reliable and 
digitised attendance data (see section 2.2). This practical example illustrates the broader 
issue that good data is an essential foundation to evidence-based policymaking. We would 
therefore recommend to embed proper data collection in all initiatives where that is possible at 
a contained cost and effort, as it would be in this case. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 The TPS training plan for 2017/18 
 
 District Date 
1 Kicukiro 21 August 2017 
2 Musanze 29 August 2017 
3 Rubavu 30 August 2017 
4 Muhanga 22 November 2017 
5 Rusizi 29 November 2017 
6 Huye 6 December 2017 
7 Nyagatare 20 December 2017 
8 Kicukiro 23 January 2018 
9 Gasabo 6 February 2018 
10 Nyarugenge 9 February 2018 
11 Kicukiro 20 February 2018 
12 Gasabo 22 February 2018 
13 Nyarugenge 7 March 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 Balance tests by attrition status 
 
Non-attrited Attrited 
 
 Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Difference ∆  
Covariates        
Age 33.24 821 32.82 186 0.42 -0.04  
Female 0.30 821 0.41 186 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.22  
No school or primary only 0.20 821 0.14 186 0.06∗ -0.16  
University degree 0.43 821 0.54 186 -0.10∗∗ 0.20  
Owner 0.79 821 0.62 186 0.17∗∗∗ -0.38∗  
Individual business 0.52 821 0.45 186 0.07∗ -0.13  
>5 employees 0.09 821 0.11 186 -0.02 0.07  
Email use 0.26 821 0.27 186 -0.01 0.02  
Bank account 0.45 821 0.44 186 0.01 -0.03  
Books of account 0.48 821 0.51 186 -0.03 0.06  
Tax time use days 2.00 605 1.32 134 0.68 -0.15  
Had previous business 0.21 821 0.23 186 -0.03 0.06  
Had previous training 0.06 821 0.10 186 -0.03 0.12  
# RRA visits 1.39 716 1.32 158 0.07 -0.03  
Knowledge and perceptions        
Baseline Knowledge Index 6.37 821 6.42 186 -0.06 0.02  
Complexity 0.71 796 0.62 177 0.10∗∗ -0.21  
Evasion attitude 0.33 782 0.34 173 -0.01 0.02  
Fairness 0.98 788 0.98 176 0.00 -0.02  
Government authority 0.95 804 0.96 181 -0.00 0.01  
Social duty 0.98 819 0.97 185 0.01 -0.06  
Public service satisfaction 0.007 802 -0.03 182 0.04 -0.04  
Observations weighted by sampling weights. T-test are computed on the Difference 
across the two groups. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. ∆ is the normalised 
difference from Imbens and Rubin (2015), equal to the difference in means scaled by 
the square root of the average of the two within-group variances. Obs. – observations. 
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Table A3 Training effect on knowledge – interactions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F Increase F Gain K Increase K Gain P Increase P Gain L Increase L Gain 
Training 0.245∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 
 (0.036) (0.079) (0.042) (0.086) (0.033) (0.079) (0.030) (0.074) 
Group -0.066 -0.182∗∗ -0.083∗ 0.02 -0.080 -0.256∗∗∗ -0.075 0.062 
 (0.054) (0.083) (0.047) (0.064) (0.061) (0.085) (0.118) (0.153) 
Group*Training 0.080 0.092 0.126∗∗ -0.070 -0.004 -0.099 -0.122 -0.346∗∗ 
 (0.063) (0.144) (0.058) (0.122) (0.075) (0.124) (0.118) (0.153) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of Y 0.714 0.571 0.714 0.571 0.714 0.571 0.714 0.571 
R2 0.208 0.360 0.211 0.360 0.206 0.360 0.208 0.361 
Observations 820 815 820 815 820 815 820 815 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Increase is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
post-pre knowledge scores difference is positive. Gain is the ratio of post-pre scores difference over the pre-training score. 
Interactions used are with dummies for female, Kigali, primary education and large size. Covariates used are those indicated 
in section 2.3. All regressions are weighted by sampling weights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4 Balance tests by assignment to coaching 
 
Control Coaching 
 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Difference  
Covariates       
Age 279 32.40 293 32.56 -0.15  
Female 279 0.30 293 0.31 -0.01  
No school or primary only 279 0.25 293 0.18 0.07∗∗  
University degree 279 0.45 293 0.44 0.01  
Owner 279 0.76 293 0.82 -0.06  
CIT 270 0.46 283 0.43 0.03  
>5 employees 279 0.06 293 0.08 -0.02  
Life in months 270 4.44 283 4.63 -0.18  
Located in Kigali 272 0.51 281 0.52 -0.00  
Email use 279 0.24 293 0.25 -0.01  
Bank account 279 0.45 293 0.40 0.05  
Books of account 279 0.46 293 0.44 0.03  
Tax time use days 214 1.73 200 2.24 -0.52  
Had previous business 279 0.18 293 0.22 -0.04  
Had previous training 279 0.06 293 0.08 -0.02  
Knowledge and perceptions       
Baseline Knowledge Index 279 6.19 293 6.25 -0.05  
Complexity 267 0.71 281 0.70 0.01  
Evasion attitude 264 0.32 278 0.32 0.00  
Fairness 265 0.97 281 0.98 -0.01  
Government authority 272 0.95 287 0.95 -0.00  
Social duty 279 0.96 291 0.99 -0.03∗∗  
Public service satisfaction 273 0.01 283 -0.01 0.02  
Observations 572      
Observations weighted by sampling weights. T-test are computed on the 
Difference across the two groups. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.  
Obs. – observations. 
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Table A5 Perception indexes description 
 
Index Components Baseline 
Complexity Difficult to file tax declaration – Difficult to get in touch with RRA 0.693 
Evasion Right for some people not to pay taxes – Fair not to pay tax if neighbours 0.316 
 
Fairness 
don’t pay – Most businesses evade at least part of their taxes 
Tax system is fair – Businesses sometimes bribe tax officials – Trust in 
 
0.940 
 
Government authority 
RRA – Enforcement probability is high 
Government can make people pay to increase public services –  
 
0.933 
 
Social duty 
Government always has a right to make people pay 
Must pay tax for Rwanda to develop – Tax is a social duty 
 
0.979 
Indexes are 1-0 dummies with the following meaning: 1 – agree or neutral; 0 – disagree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6 Training effect on probability to declare – interactions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No interact. Female Kigali Primary Large Top know 
Training 0.12∗∗∗ 0.07 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Group  -0.02 0.00 -0.17∗∗ -0.11 0.19∗∗ 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
Group*Attend  0.15∗ 0.02 0.17∗ 0.11 -0.02 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Knowledge/perceptions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 980 980 980 980 980 980 
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are marginal 
effects from probit regressions. Covariates used are those indicated in section 2.3. All regressions 
are weighted by sampling weights. 
35  
Table A7 Impacts of knowledge increase on tax outcomes – IV strategy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Inc. nilfile Inc. nilfile Gain nilfile Gain nilfile Inc. tax Inc. tax Gain tax Gain tax 
Knowledge -0.26 -0.26 -0.10 -0.12 3.56 3.34 1.21 1.35 
 (0.31) (0.23) (0.11) (0.10) (3.51) (2.74) (1.13) (1.06) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Knowledge/perceptions No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Mean of Y 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 3.480 3.480 3.480 3.480 
Observations 280 280 280 280 262 262 262 262 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The instrument is attendance to the training. Increase 
is a dummy variable indicating whether the post-pre knowledge score difference is positive. Gain is the ratio of the difference 
over the 0-10 pre-training score. Exclusion restriction holds: p-value of the IV in a regression with Knowledge is 11% for both 
Inc. nilfile and Inc. tax and 26% for Gain nilfile and 17% for Gain tax. Covariates used are those indicated in section 2.3. All 
regressions weighted by sampling weights. 
 
 
Table A8 Tests for exclusion restriction 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Declare Nilfile Log tax 
Training 0.17∗∗∗ 
(0.03) 
-0.11∗∗∗ 
(0.03) 
1.00∗∗∗ 
(0.39) 
Assignment survey 0.01 0.05 -0.34 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.38) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.217 0.070 0.025 
Observations 2,378 907 860 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Coaching group has been dropped. 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
 
 
Table A9 Impact of training on probability to nilfile 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Survey All Survey rural All rural Survey urban All urban 
Training -0.123∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.133 -0.195∗∗∗ -0.102 0.000 
 (0.060) (0.016) (0.087) (0.040) (0.078) (0.017) 
Admin. covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax centre FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 393 6,410 188 1,169 203 5,240 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients are marginal effects from probit regression computed at the mean of covariates. 
All regressions are weighted by sampling weights. FEs – fixed effects. 
 
 
Table A10 Impact of training on the log tax declared 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Survey All Survey rural All rural Survey urban All urban 
Training 1.065∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.910 1.716∗∗∗ 0.871 -0.167 
 (0.643) (0.159) (0.892) (0.368) (0.862) (0.194) 
Admin. covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax centre FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 361 6,078 174 1,034 187 5,044 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients are marginal effects from tobit regression computed at the mean of covariates. 
All regressions are weighted by sampling weights. FEs – fixed effects. 
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Figure A1 Propensity score distribution by training groups 
 
